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Abstract
When a group of people are thinking about some true formula A, one of them
may know it, all of them may know it, or it might be common knowledge. But
there are also many other possible states of knowledge and they can change when
communication takes place. What states of knowledge are possible? What is the
dynamics of such changes? And how do they aect possible co-ordinated action?
We describe some developments in this domain.
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A travelling salesman found himself spending the night at home with his
wife when one of his trips was accidentally cancelled. The two of them were
sound asleep, when in the middle of the night there was a loud knock at
the front door. The wife woke up with a start and cried out, `Oh my God!
It's my husband!' Whereupon the husband leapt out of bed, ran across the
room and jumped out the window.
Schank and Abelson, 1977, p. 59.
1 Introduction
Wimmer and Perner begin their paper [19] on Beliefs about beliefs with this
story from Schank and Abelson which may seem amusing to some and dis-
turbing to others. But the point of the story seems to be that husband and
wife each have their own scenario and neither corresponds to the actuality.
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Wimmer and Perner themselves are concerned primarily with the percep-
tion by children of other people's mindsets. The following quote from [19] is a
story (in Austrian English) about Maxi which they told a group of children:
Mother returns from her shopping trip. She bought chocolate for a cake.
Maxi may help her put away the things. He asks her `Where should I put
the chocolate?' In the blue cupboard, says the mother.
Later, with Maxi gone out to play, the mother transfers the chocolate from
the blue cupboard to the green cupboard. Maxi then comes back from the
playground, hungry, and he wants to get some chocolate.
In Wimmer and Perner's experiment, little children who were told the
Maxi story were then asked the BELIEF question, \Where will Maxi look for
the chocolate?"
Children at the age of 3 or less invariably got the answer wrong and as-
sumed that Maxi would look for the chocolate in the green cupboard where
they knew it was. Even children aged 4-5 had only a one third chance of
correctly answering this question or an analgous question involving Maxi and
his brother (who also wants the chocolate and whom Maxi wants to deceive).
Children aged 6 or more were by contrast quite successful in realizing that
Maxi would think the chocolate would be in the blue cupboard { where he
had put it and that if he wanted to deceive his brother, he should lead his
brother towards the green cupboard.
Thus it seems that representation of other people's mindset comes fairly
late in childhood, well after they have learned to deal with notions of belief
and belief based action for themselves and for others who share their own
view of reality. In [18] Chris Steinsvold investigates modal logics which are
intended to represent the states of mind of young children. See also [17].
Older children are not much better. In an experiment in my daughter's 7th
grade class, I found that they were unable to deal with the muddy children
puzzle beyond the rst one or two levels.
In this, by now well known puzzle, a number of children are playing in the
mud and some of them get their foreheads dirty. At this the father comes on
the scene and announces, \at least one of you has got her forehead dirty".
Scenario 1: Suppose there is only one child, say Amy, who is dirty. Then
she will realize that her own forehead must be dirty since she can see that the
others are clean.
Scenario 2: Suppose now that there are two dirty children, Sarah and
Amy, who are asked in turn, \Do you know if your forehead is dirty?" Now
when Sarah is asked, she can see Amy's dirty forehead and she replies, \I don't
know". However, when Amy is asked, she is able to reason, \If my forehead
were clean, Sarah would have known that hers must be dirty since all the
others are clean. But Sarah did not know. So my forehead must be dirty."
This reasoning on Amy's part requires a representation by Amy of Sarah's
state of mind, and clearly Amy must be at least six for this to work. However,
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Sarah herself must have some reasoning ability and Amy must know that she
has such abilities. It is not enough for Amy to know Sarah's view of reality,
she must also represent Sarah's logical abilities in her own mind.
As the number of dirty children goes up, there is a need for higher and
higher levels of "I know that he knows that she knows that...". Common
knowledge is at the end of this road and has been oered as the explanation of
co-ordinated behaviour ([8,6,2]). For instance Halpern and Moses in [6] show
that the co-ordinated attack problem requires common knowledge between
the two generals, and that given the means of communication they have,
such common knowledge is impossible to attain. Clark and Marshall indicate
similar diÆculties with the referent of \the movie playing at the Roxy today".
While it is true that co-ordinated actions and, supposedly, common knowl-
edge do happen, it may also be relevant to consider other levels of knowledge,
short of the innite, common knowledge, level.
3
Such levels also arise in cer-
tainly pragmatic situations, e.g. with email or snailmail or messages left on
telephones as voice mail. Thus the purpose of this paper is to study levels
other than common knowledge.
In typical co-operative situations even if a certain level of knowledge is
needed, a higher level would also do. If Bob wants Jill to pick up the children
at 4 PM, it is enough for him to know that she knows. Thus if he sends
her email at 2 PM and knows that she always reads hers at 3 PM, he can be
satised. In such a situation Bob knows that Ann will know about the children
in time, or symbolically K
b
(K
a
(C)) and he may feel this is enough. However,
if he telephones her at 3 PM instead, this will create common knowledge of
C, much more than is needed. But no harm done, since in this context,
Ann and Bob have the same goals. Halpern and Zuck also state a knowledge
level requirement for the sequence transmission problem, which suÆces as
a minimum, but since the parties are co-ordinating, a higher level does not
harm.
But in other contexts one may wish for just a particular level of knowledge,
no lower, and no higher. Suppose for instance that Bob wants Ann to know
about a seminar talk he is giving, just in case she wants to come, but he does
not want her to feel pressured to come { she should come only out of interest
and not from politeness. In that case he will want to arrange that K
b
(K
a
(S)),
(he himself knows that she knows about the seminar) but not K
a
(K
b
(K
a
(S)))
3
The following, possibly apocryphal story about the mathematician Norbert Wiener, who
was well known for his absent mindedness, illustrates something even more subtle. At one
time the Wieners were moving and in the morning as he was going to work, Mrs. Wiener
said to him, "Now don't come home to this address in the evening." And she gave him a
piece of paper with the new address. However, in the evening Wiener found himself standing
in front of the old address and not knowing what to do { he had in the meanwhile lost the
slip of paper with the new address. He went to a little girl standing by and said, "Little
girl, do you know where the Wieners have moved to?" The little girl replied, "Daddy, Mom
knew what would happen so she sent me to fetch you." The moral of the story, for us, is
that common knowledge works only if the memory of all parties involved is reliable.
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(Ann knows that Bob knows that Ann knows about the seminar), for in the
latter case she would feel pressured. Instead of telling her about his talk, which
would create common knowledge, he may arrange for some other method,
perhaps for a student to tell her, but without saying that it is a message from
Bob.
Suppose a pedestrian is crossing the street and sees a car approaching him.
It happens in many cities, Boston, Naples, etc., that the pedestrian will pre-
tend not to notice the car, thereby preventing K
d
K
p
(C) with C representing
the car, d being the driver and p the pedestrian. If the driver knew that the
pedestrian knew, he might drive aggressively and try to bully the pedestrian
into running or withdrawing. But if he does not know that the pedestrian
knows, he will be more cautious.
While the social questions are fascinating and are addressed elsewhere (Cf.
[13]), in this paper we shall concentrate on the technical aspects of knowledge,
where it is assumed that everyone involved is logically perfect. One can still
ask, what are the various levels of knowledge which can arise under various
circumstances of communication?
2 Model of a distributed system
Note: most of the results which follow are joint with Paul Krasucki, except
where indicated, and full proofs are available in [14].
We assume that there are a nite number of processes, 1; :::; n, which
compute and communicate with each other either by asynchronous messages
or by broadcasts. Our network is assumed to be fully connected
4
(there is a
channel from every process to every other process).
Asynchronous communication consists of two phases: send and receive.
All messages sent are ultimately delivered (and they are delivered in the order
in which they were sent) but the delay (transmission time) may be arbitrarily
long.
Broadcasts are fully reliable, synchronous communications
5
where all pro-
cesses involved simulteneously receive the message sent by one of them.
Now we formally specify our class of models. Let N = f1; :::; ng be the set
of all processors. Every processor i has innitely many possible initial states
4
If the network is not fully connected then some levels of knowledge may be impossible
to realize due to the lack of communication capabilities, e.g. if a processor is isolated (can-
not communicate with anyone)then the other processes cannot learn anything from that
process. Interesting questions arise in case of a directed network where every process may
communicate with every other process but some communications are necessarily indirect
(go through other processes). We will not analyze this case here.
5
The two kinds of communications can be looked at as two kinds of communication media
e.g. mailing system (asynchronous) and telephone lines (synchronous). Since we allow for
synchronous communication between more than two processes at a time, our telephone
system must have \conference call" capability.
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v. Every initial state is a string of 0's and 1's (v 2 f0; 1g

). The set of initial
states for i we denote by V
i
. The set of global initial states is V =
Q
n
i=1
V
i
.
From now on we will use lower case letters to denote everything pertaining
to a single process. Capitals will be used where all the processes are involved
(e.g. v
i
is an initial state of a processor i, while V is an initial conguration
of the whole system: V = (v
1
; :::; v
n
)).
Events: E
i
denotes the set of all events in which processor i can partic-
ipate (events local to i). There are the following types of events (or actions):
(i) L
i
: Local computation steps.
(ii) s(i; j;m): Sending a message m to a processor j, j 2 N .
(iii) r(j; i;m): Receiving a message m from a processor j, j 2 N .
(iv) bc(i; U;m): Sending a broadcastm to a group of processors U , i 2 U  N .
The same event is receiving a broadcast m by a group of processes U .
E
i
=L
i
[ fs(i; j;m)jm 2 M; j 2 Ng [ fr(j; i;m)jm 2 M; j 2 Ng
[ fbc(j; U;m)jm 2 M; i; j 2 U  Ng [ fbc(i; U;m)jm 2 M; i 2 U  Ng
We dene the set of global events G in our system. G 
Q
n
i=1
(E
i
[
fnullg) (a cartesian product) s.t. if (e
1
; :::; e
i
; :::; e
n
) 2 G for some i and
e
i
= bc(j; U;m) then for all i
0
2 U , e
i
0
= bc(j; U;m). If e
i
= null for some i,
it means that there is no local event at i at this point. Note that null is not
local to any process. We use the notation (G)
i
to denote the ith coordinate
of G, so (e
1
; :::; e
i
; :::; e
n
)
i
= e
i
.
Histories: A history (a run) is an input value followed by a sequence of
events. Let's call the set of all possible histories of the system { a protocol P.
So P  V ;G

. Protocols are always closed under taking an initial segment of
a history: H 2 P implies that every H
0
which is an initial segment of H is in
P.
We will require that for every receive in every history in every protocol
there is exactly one corresponding send and it occurs before receive (this con-
dition we will call time-consistency).
We say that two histories H and H
0
are compatible i they start with the
same input values.
We can dene the concatenation of compatible histories:
If H
1
= V ;G
1
; : : : ;G
k
, and H
2
= V ;G
0
1
; : : : ;G
0
l
, then H is the concatenation
of H
1
and H
2
i H = V ;G
1
; : : : ;G
k
;G
0
1
; : : : ;G
0
l
,
Local histories are the projections of global histories onto the sets of local
events of the processors. They are \time-forgetting".
We assume that a global event { the ticking of the clock { takes place even
if no local events take place at a particular moment. Given i, and the global
history H, the local history h
i
consisting of the events seen by i, is uniquely
dened and we let 
i
be the map which takes us from H to h
i
.
The local history is everything the processor sees, so all the global histories
which correspond to the same local history h
i
look the same to the processor
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i. Note that the length of 
i
(H) is less than or equal to the length of H. In
fact length(
i
(H)) = length(H) i there are no null events on i in H.
For every i we can dene an equivalence relation on the set of global
histories:
H 
i
H
0
i 
i
(H) = 
i
(H
0
)
This relation is extended to groups U by letting H 
U
H
0
i there exists a
chain H = H
1
; H
2
; :::; H
m
= H
0
and for all i < n, there is a j 2 U such that
H
i

j
H
i+1
.
We use capital letters to denote global histories, events etc, lower case
letters do denote local histories, events etc.
Closure Conditions for the Protocol: We impose some additional
conditions on the protocol P. We want to ensure that the initial state of i (v
i
)
cannot be known to any other process j at any run of the system, unless j
learns about v
i
from some communication. We want to exclude the possibility
that something is common knowledge \accidentally". To achieve that we will
make sure that all the initial states are possible. Moreover, if v
i
is the initial
state of i, all other strings v
0
i
will remain possible for j as initial states of i,
unless j gets some message from i to the contrary (directly or via some other
processors).
1) All vectors of input values are possible: 8V s:t: V = (v
1
; : : : ; v
n
) where
every v
i
is a sequence of 0's and 1's there is some H 2 P s.t. for some H
0
,
H = V ;H
0
.
2) No sequence of local events on some group of processes can inuence
possible actions of some other group of processes unless there are some com-
munications (of course assuming that both groups are disjoint).
For that we need some closure conditions on the set of all protocols. The
rst condition we use is due to [2] (it is the rst of their principles of compu-
tation extension ).
We need one denition:
Let G = (e
1
; : : : e
n
), G is on U if U = fij(G)
i
6= nullg (so U is the set of
processes which have some local events in G).
Closure conditions:
(i) Extension Rule:
Let 8i 2 U; H 
i
H
0
, G is on U , none of (G)
i
is receive r(j; i;m) for any j
not in U , then
( H
0
2 P; H;G 2 P) ) H
0
;G 2 P
The extension rule guarantees that if we have a protocol P, some history
H in P and some action of a group of processes U is possible in H, then the
same action must be possible in every history H
0
which looks the same to all
processes in U unless it violates time{consistency. In order to explain why e
i
cannot be a receive from a processor outside of U let us examine an example:
Let N = f1; 2; 3g, U = f1; 2g.
H = (null; null; s(3; 1; m)), H
0
= (null; null; null). Clearly H 
1
H
0
and
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H 
2
H
0
. If we take G = (r(3; 1; m); null; null) s.t. H;G 2 P then requiring
H
0
;G to be in P would violate time{consistency.
The following conditions ensure that no process can get any additional
information about the other processes by observing its own local events (no
hidden synchronization). These conditions are necessary because (unlike [2])
we allow local events at dierent sites at the same instant of time. Condition
(ii) says that if some local events have occurred in parallel, and the sets of
participating processes were disjoint, they could have occurred in sequence.
We'll call it the splitting rule.
(ii) Splitting Rule:
G = (e
1
; : : : e
n
), G 62 V , G is on U . Given U
1
; U
2
s.t. U
1
[ U
2
= U and U
1
; U
2
disjoint, then we can \split" any G into G
1
and G
2
:
(H;G 2 P) ) H;G
1
;G
2
2 P
where (G)
i
= (G
1
)
i
for i 2 U
1
, (G)
i
= (G
2
)
i
for i 2 U
2
, (G
1
)
j
= null = (G
2
)
k
for j 62 U
1
, k 62 U
2
provided that we don't split any broadcasts: (G)
i
=
bc(i; V;m) ! V  U
1
_ V  U
2
.
Condition (iii) says that if some local events have occurred in sequence,
the sets of participating processes were disjoint, and there was no send receive
pair in them, they could have occurred in parallel.
(iii) Joining Rule:
Given U
1
; U
2
s.t. U
1
[U
2
= U and U
1
; U
2
disjoint, Let G
1
be on U
1
, G
2
on U
2
,
and if (G
1
)
i
= s(i; j;m) then (G
2
)
j
6= r(i; j;m).
(H;G
1
;G
2
2 P ) H;G 2 P)
where (G)
i
= (G
1
)
i
for i 2 U
1
, (G)
i
= (G
2
)
i
for i 2 U
2
.
Systems: We consider three kinds of systems. Asynchronous systems
are the systems as described above but without broadcasts. So in asynchronous
systems the only communications are via send and receive. Synchronous sys-
tems are the systems in which all the communications are done using broad-
casts where we don't have the events send and receive. Finally, we use
the name mixed communications systems for the systems with both kinds of
communications available.
2.1 Language and Semantics
Let L
0
be a language which describes properties of the global histories in a
protocol P. So for every sentence A in L
0
, and for every history H 2 P, A is
either true or false in H.
We want to make sure that in every history initially every processor has
some \private" information not known to any other processor. To accomplish
that we assume that we have in our language a countable set of propositions
L
1
= fQ
i;j
g
i;j2N
. Q
i;j
is the proposition that the jth input value of i is 1.
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All Q
i;j
are independent. Private information of i in H are P
i;j
which are Q
i;j
or its negation depending on whether Q
i;j
is true in H or not. Note that the
private information is not a truth value of any formula, but which formula
we're looking at.
L is the closure of L
0
under truth functional connectives. L can be ex-
tended to a larger language L
C
which is the closure of L under common knowl-
edge operators C
U
(for U  N) and the usual truth functional connectives.
C
U
(A) means that there is common knowledge of A among processes from U .
The knowledge of a single process corresponds to C
fig
. We will then use
the notation
6
K
i
for C
fig
. When we restrict ourselves to a subset of L
C
in
which all common knowledge operators are in fact the knowledge operators
(the sets U in C
U
are always singletons) then we use the notation L
K
.
The class of all models we consider is the class of all protocols P as de-
scribed in the previous section. Fix P. Now we dene the notion H j= A for
A in L
+
by recursion on the complexity of A.
0) If A is from L
0
then the semantics is given.
1) If A is Q
i;j
then A is true in H if the jth bit of an input of processor i in
H is 1:
H j= A i H = (v
1
; : : : ; v
n
);H
0
; (v
i
)
j
= 1
2) If A is :A
0
then
H j= A i H 6j= A
0
If A is B _ C then
H j= A i ( H j= B or H j= C )
3) If A is of the form K
i
(B) then
H j= K
i
A i 8H
0
2 P H 
i
H
0
! H
0
j= A
4) If A is of the form C
U
(B), then
H j= A i for all H
0
; H
0

U
H;H
0
j= B
Also if U is empty, then C
U
A i A.
Theorem 2.1 Let 
C
be the alphabet whose symbols are fC
U
g
UN
For all x,
y in 

C
, and all formulae A, for all H, V  U  N , H j= xC
U
C
V
yA i
H j= xC
V
C
U
yA i H j= xC
U
yA.
Corollary 2.2 Let 
K
be the alphabet whose symbols are fK
1
; : : : ; K
n
g For
all a in 
K
, and for all x, y, in 

K
, and all formulae A,
` xayA$ xaayA
6
Fact that C
fig
= K
i
was noticed earlier, compare e.g. [4]. It is important that we assume
that L
K
and L
C
are S5 (we need at least S4).
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and hence for all H, H j= xayA i H j= xaayA. I.e. repeated occurrences of
a are without eect and if xay 2 T
K
(A;H) then 8n xa
n
y 2 T
K
(A;H).
Denition 2.3 Given a formula A and a history H, the level of A at H,
L(A;H) is the set of x in 

C
such that H j= xA, and x contains no substrings
C
U
C
V
, C
V
C
U
for any V  U  N .
If H is clear from the context, or not important, then we shall drop it as
a parameter. If we restrict ourselves to the K
i
operators, we denote the level
of A in H by L
K
(A;H).
3 Embeddability
Now we will try to characterize levels of knowledge. First we need to introduce
the embeddability ordering on strings which turns out to be important here.
Denition 3.1 Given two strings x and y, we say that x is embeddable in
y (x  y), if all the symbols of x occur in y, in the same order, but not
necessarily consecutively. Formally:
1) x  x,   x for all x
2) x  y if there exist x
0
, x
00
, y
0
, y
00
, (y
0
; y
00
6= ), such that x = x
0
x
00
, y = y
0
y
00
,
and x
0
 y
0
, x
00
 y
00
.
and  is the smallest relation satisfying (1) and (2).
Thus the string aba is embeddable in itself, in aaba and in abca, but not
in aabb.
Properties of the embeddability relation 
Fact 3.2 Embeddability is a well partial order, i.e. it is not only well founded,
but every linear order that extends it is a well order (equivalent condition: it
is well founded and every set of mutually incomparable elements is nite).
Fact 3.3 Embeddability can be tested in linear time, e.g. by a nondeterminis-
tic nite automaton with two input tapes.
For a proof of fact 3.2 see [?]. Fact 3.3 is straightforward.
We also need a stronger relation dened on 

C
, which we callC{embeddability.
Denition 3.4 Given two strings x and y, we say that x is C{embeddable in
y (x  y), if
1) If V  U then C
V
 C
U
2) x  y if there exist x
0
, x
00
, y
0
, y
00
, (y
0
; y
00
6= ), such that x = x
0
x
00
, y = y
0
y
00
,
and x
0
 y
0
, x
00
 y
00
.
and  is the smallest relation satisfying (1) and (2).
Fact 3.5 For any x; y 2 

, x  y i x  y.
Fact 3.6 C-embeddability is a well partial order.
Fact 3.5 is easy. It is also easy to check that C-embeddability is a partial
order. It is well founded, because regular embeddability is well founded and
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for given x 2 

C
there are only nitely many y 2 

C
s.t. jxj = jyj and y  x.
There are only nitely many incomparable elements in 

C
with respect to
, and there are more incomparable elements with respect to  than with
respect to , so  is a well partial order. 2
If  is a partial order on S, we can dene a notion of a downward closed
subset of S:
Denition 3.7 R  S is downward closed i x 2 R implies 8y  x; y 2 R.
We will look at downward closed sets with respect to embeddability and
C-embeddability.
Theorem 3.8 Let 
C
be the alphabet whose symbols are fC
U
g
UN
. Then for
all strings x, y 

C
, if x  y then for all histories H, if H j= yA then H j= xA.
4 The Main Results
Corollary 4.1 Every level of knowledge is a downward closed set with respect
to . 2
Theorem 4.2 There are only countably many levels of knowledge and in fact
all of them are regular subsets of 

(where  is either 
K
or 
C
). 2
Fact 4.3 Eric Pacuit of the CUNY Graduate center and ourselves have shown
that in contrast with knowledge there are uncountably many possible levels of
rational belief. This is curious as truth is the only condition which (formally)
separates knowledge from rational belief. These results will appear elsewhere.
Corollary 4.4 The membership problem for a level of knowledge can be solved
in linear time.
Theorem 4.5 If L is a non-empty nite subset of 

K
, then L is downward
closed i for some k,
L =
k
[
i=1
dc(fx
i
g)
where x
i
2 

K
. This theorem reiterates the fact that the nite levels are
characterized by their maximal elements (x
1
; :::; x
k
are maximal).
Denition 4.6 A formula A is persistent if whenever H j= A and H
0
extends
H, then H
0
j= A.
Theorem 4.7 If A is persistent then so is K
i
(A) for any i.
Theorem 4.8 Every formula A which is a boolean combination of P
i
's is
persistent. 2
Theorem 4.9 Every formula of the form xA where A is a boolean combina-
tion of P
i
's, and x is a string of knowledge operators is persistent. 2
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Theorem 4.10 (Chandy, Misra) If communication is purely asynchronous,
and for some histories H;H
0
, s.t. H is an initial segment of H
0
:
H
0
j= K
1
K
2
:::K
n
A and H 6j= K
n
A
then in H
0
 H there must be a sequence of messages: m
n 1
; m
n 2
; : : : ; m
1
s.t.
m
n 1
is sent by n and reaches n  1 (maybe via some other processes),: : :,m
1
is sent by 2 and (maybe indirectly) reaches 1 (messages may be dierent but
they all must imply A). Moreover if A doesn't depend on any local event of n
(its truth value depends on some event e 62 E
n
) then there must be some event
of the form r(i; n;m) occurring after H but before s(n; n  1; m
n 1
).
Theorem 4.11 Every nite downward closed set is the set L(A;H) for an
appropriate A and H in some asynchronous protocol.
Theorem 4.12 Every downward closed set L of strings without repetitions
is L(A;H) for suitable A and H in a synchronous system with at least 3
processors.
Theorem 4.13 In a two processor system with only synchronous communi-
cation available, no nite level containing strings of length  2 can be achieved
for any formula A.
Theorem 4.14 In system with k-casts, i.e. with broadcasts involving at most
k processors, it is impossible to achieve common knowledge of any new fact in
a group of size > k.
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